Schiller and Company, or How Habermas Incites Us to Play by Sommer, Doris
 
Schiller and Company, or How Habermas Incites Us to Play
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Sommer, Dorris. 2009. Schiller and company, or how Habermas
incites us to play. New Literary History 40(1): 85-103.
Published Version doi:10.1353/nlh.0.0069
Accessed February 19, 2015 8:52:33 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5125276
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP Doris Sommer
Schiller and Company, or
How Habermas Incites Us to Play
  Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) 
is worth re-reading today from the troubled fronts of politics and pedagogy.1 
While our government claims to defend democracy by waging war abroad 
and creating immigration crises at home, we might remember Schiller’s 
concern about the French Revolution running headstrong behind reason into 
“barbarism” as it toppled one state in its enthusiasm for another. Specters of 
that abstract and unfeeling reason are also driving our public schools toward 
quantitative measurement of student achievement and the self-destructive 
elimination of arts and interpretation. Public education, so earnestly bent on 
practical results that it squeezes out room and resources for play and the arts 
in order to add another math class or a prep session, hopes to raise scores on 
standardized tests. Ironically for educators and tragically for children, the 
sacrifice of play and arts on an altar of correctness has actually kept the 
scores down, because the tests measure more than data retrieval; they also 
gauge the students’ freer critical faculty, which depends on the exercise of 
imagination that Schiller called play. Schools are failing our children, in part 
at least, through indifference or excessive caution about creativity.Surely the connection between the eroded room for political debate 
and a play starved  education is worth worrying about again, if worry leads  00 0 0
to ways beyond the crisis. Too often academic essays that offer analysis and  0 0 0 0
critique stop short of speculating about remedies, as if intellectual work   0
were constrained from exploring what Schiller called imaginative  0 0
“appearances.” But essays that remain risk-averse miss the potential of the  0
genre to “assay” or to try out ideas. I confess to a preference for risk and 
invite you to consider joining Schiller and company as advocates for an  0
aesthetic education that promotes making art, not only appreciating it, by 
developing an innate drive to play, the Spieltrieb that Schiller identified and 
named as man’s faculty for turning conflict into beautiful works of art. By  0 0
re-reading Schiller and mentioning the reformist educators who directly or  0 0
indirectly follow him, I hope to offer a few unanticipated connections that  0 0
may have some scholarly interest, but my purpose is to prime our urgent  0 0
conversations today with his enduring, almost eerily contemporary, 
invitation to loosen up and to play. 
LET’S LOOSEN UP
Our humanity depends on it he was sure, because playfulness for  0
Schiller is no frivolous pastime. Play is the instinct for freedom and for art, 
the drive that can harmonize man’s two other mutually murderous instincts, 
transforming the conflict between Passion and Reason into aesthetic  0 0pleasure. Man is mortal flesh, driven by the material instinct which enslaves  0
him to nature through the passions and holds him back in a savage state. He 
is also a timeless spirit that obeys the instinct of reason which organizes the  0
world into abstract pitiless principles that can reduce human life to barbarity 
[Letter xx]. Seriousness may address what is useful or moral, but only play 
engages the disinterested intensity that opens paths toward freedom [Letter 
xv]. Other philosophers who looked on as France convulsed in revolutionary 
spasms turned anxiously to political events where they assumed the “great 
destiny of man is to be played out” [Letter ii];  and they considered 
competing designs of the state in order to determine which was most useful 
for constructing and preserving civilization. But Schiller mistrusted the cold 
scrutiny and bracketed the big political questions. He went to the heart of the 
matter and identified the crisis as an abandonment of the imaginative arts  00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
and therefore of freedom: 0 0
Utility is the great idol of the time, to which all powers 0
do homage and all subjects are subservient. In this great balance 
of utility, the spiritual service of art has no weight, and, 
deprived of all encouragement; it vanishes from the noisy 
Vanity Fair of our time. The very spirit of philosophical inquiry 
itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and the frontiers of art are narrowed, in proportion as the limits of 
science are enlarged. [Letter ii]
Schiller anticipates objections to his defense of the freedom achieved 
through play and the arts as a value that trumps even political rationality.  0 0 0 0 0
Perhaps the young reader to whom he addresses these letters would prefer “a 
loftier theme than that of art,” which probably seemed “unseasonable in 
desperate times” [Letter ii]. Yet the preference is quite practical, Schiller 
explains, because play can lead the way to liberty while political philosophy  0 0
keeps missing its target. Creative arts exercise the free play of imagination 
as they produce new forms, objects, and arrangements.  Making something 
new, something for which there is no prior concept, is the liberating activity  0 0 0 0
that rises above man’s dual nature. Only this playfulness can win some  0 0 0 0 0
distance from the conflicting drives of sensuousness and reason to locate the  0
freedom that art thrives on. True artists don’t deny or avoid conflict; they 
struggle with it, energized by contending forces to produce beautiful new 
works that bear a mark of the freedom that enabled innovation. And that 
mark, made visible or audible to the public through a work of art, multiplies 
the experience of freedom into a shared or common sense on which to  0 0
ground enlightened politics. By contrast, impulsive and deductive political 
philosophy is a top-down affair that was leading France to forfeit freedom. 
Inspired by an abstract ideal, philosophy failed to take into account the complexity of human nature: mere reason underestimated the real dangers of 
resistance and reprisal. 
This is why Hannah Arendt rejected idealist upheavals, from the 
French Revolution to the Bolshevik Revolution it stirred up a century later. 
She much preferred the liberal and pragmatic American style of 
revolutionary independence that followed gradually from freely entered 
personal contracts and added up to a free state.2 Were Arendt writing today 
however, rather than in 1962, she might conclude that by now liberal 
economics has outlived its revolutionary promise to level hierarchies and 
reward individual effort. Mature economies flourish on the social and 
political asymmetries that liberalism leaves in its wake, both domestically 
and internationally, while developing states struggle to emulate powerful 
counterparts in order to enter into economic accords, even when the political 
costs are high.3  If liberal answers to the demand for political freedom now 
fail to show the way, and idealist approaches were misguided from the start, 
what route remains?  Schiller would not have been stumped by the question, 
even if he had hoped to follow the liberal course and found it clogged, 
because the alternative he articulated to primarily political paths has real 
staying power. 
Beauty is the only sure, if indirect, conduit to freedom. Schiller 
insisted that “this matter of art is less foreign to the needs than to the tastes of our age; nay, that, to arrive at a solution even in the political the road of 
aesthetics must be pursued, because it is through beauty that we arrive at 
freedom” [Letter ii]. Almost anyone at the time of the French Revolution 
could see that those who pursue short-cuts to liberty as an abstract and 
reasonable principle, indifferent to human passions and material needs, do 
violence to the very people they would set free. An aesthetic education that 
includes both making and appreciating art is Schiller’s remedy for 
revolution, because art exercises our human faculties in ways that embrace 
antagonism and contain it. To be moved by an aesthetically pleasing effect is 
to acknowledge for a moment, or for as long as the experience of beauty 
lasts, a success in wrestling material into new forms, repairing the damage 
that flesh and spirit do to one another. At precarious peace in the world, an 
artist or an admirer -- both count as active citizens for Schiller, though real 
fans are artists in training -- achieves freedom and invites others to share and 
to cultivate the experience. And, since wrestling with matter and 
circumstance takes discipline and training, Schiller offers his series of letters 
as encouragement and advice. 
FACE TO FACE
Strategically, Schiller addresses himself to one reader.   A first 
recommendation follows implicitly from this strategy: to focus on reforming 
one individual at a time, not on creating a collective or a state. He performs the intimacy of one-on-one instruction through personal letters to a single 
young citizen, rather than addressing a general treatise to an entire  
hypostasized republic of readers. Even though Schiller concedes that “the 
establishment and structure of true political freedom” is the most perfect 
work of art [Letter ii], to perfect that work meant first to prepare appropriate 
workers, in the shape of sturdy and judicious citizens. Unlike other arts that 
can transform raw material beyond recognition into new objects, politics 
demands a gentler touch; it depends on human beings as both the raw 
material and the ultimate users of the product: “The political and educating 
artist has to treat his material man with a very different kind of respect from 
that shown by the artist of fine art to his work. He must spare man's 
peculiarity and personality, not to produce a deceptive effect on the senses, 
but objectively and out of consideration for his inner being” [Letter iv].  The 
step-by-step aesthetic education offers a “subjective” transformation of each 
person’s private war between conflicting drives into a knack for making 
public peace offerings. There is really no alternative because, unredeemed 
by art, man stays torn or he just stays stuck, mired on one side in material 
appetites and arrested on the other by strictures of morality and law. 
The pedagogical process takes time, Schiller admits, so we had better 
be prepared to spend it. There is no quick fix, since rushing ahead of our 
“subjective” time-bound bodies to design an “objective” state derived from timeless ideals is sure to suppress a good part of our humanity [Letter iv].4 
“To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the 
world and history is naïve and simplistic,” Paolo Freire would repeat in our 
time, through the updated manual for educators he composed in response to 
scientific Marxists; “It is to admit the impossible: a world without men.”5 
And today Jacques Rancière defends the one-on-one approach in, for 
example, his comments on a “one-seater” contemplative theater project that 
earned the scorn of critics who imagine that political art needs to address 
particular issues: “It is political by virtue or the very distance that it takes 
with respect to [social structure, conflict, identities] . . . It is political as its 
own practices shape forms of visibility that reframe the way in which 
practices, manners of being and modes of feeling and saying are interwoven 
in a commonsense, which means a ‘sense of the common.’”6 No enlightened 
masterpiece of legislation can move people to identify with the state, unless 
people are already educated in the spirit of freedom that the state presumably 
represents. “Perhaps there is a vicious circle in our previous reasoning,” 
Schiller teases [Letter ix]. Freire will point to the same dizzying and 
discouraging circle when he asks, “if the implementation of a liberating 
education requires political power and the oppressed have none, how then is 
it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed prior to the 
revolution?”7 The way out and forward, Schiller says, is to take a step backwards, away from both of the conflicting drives that pull man in 
opposite and deadly directions. The opening activity or “instrument” that 
affords some distance for contemplation, away from the contention of 
corporeal neediness and disembodied knowledge “is the art of the 
beautiful” [Letter ix]. 
 for this newly necessary faculty is found in the judgment of beauty, 
because appreciation for beauty does not depend either on the a priori 
principles of nature or on pre-existing personal needs or desires. The 
pleasure produced by beauty can therefore be disinterested. Subjects can 
determine whether a particular object or event is in fact beautiful, or merely 
pleasing, by disengaging from the stimulus long enough to examine their 
ulterior motives for feeling pleasure.  If there are none, if the pleasure has 
owed no debt to need or want or anticipation, then the pleasure is judged to 
be aesthetic. 
This unpredictable, disarmingly new quality of beauty remains the 
signpost for Schiller’s aesthetic education. His first letter announces that the 
series will “rest chiefly upon Kantian principles” and apologizes in advance 
for any deviation as due to the writer’s own incapacity. In fact, except for 
one dramatic difference – a focus on making rather than judging -- Schiller 
does stay quite close to Kant, even while he takes smaller liberties too by 
coining neologisms to replace the master’s terms and by disconnecting morality from desire. For example, where Kant had counterpoised pure 
reason (the faculty of knowledge and understanding through universal a 
priori principles in nature) to practical reason (the faculty of desire and 
subjectivity in moral reasoning grounded in freedom), Schiller keeps the 
distinction but drives it to more evident conflict by renaming the faculties as 
instincts. The Formtrieb [formal drive] lines up with reason and abstract 
principles to wrest order from multifarious nature; and the Sinnestrieb 
[sensual drive] names lawless sensual desire still enslaved by nature. 
Competing against each other, they would tear tormented man into lifeless 
pieces. 
Kant offered his Third Critique on aesthetic judgment as a bridge 
between pure and practical reason because “there is a great gulf fixed” 
between the realm of the supersensible and that of sensible nature.8 He 
managed to connect the two thanks to the faculty of judgment which works 
in both registers of reason to keep them in check: “A critique of pure reason, 
i.e., of our faculty of judging on a priori principles, would be incomplete if 
the critical examination of judgment, which is a faculty of knowledge, and 
as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with 
separately.”9 Not that judgment can be separated from reason, to which it is 
annexed in the process of reasoning, but that it needs to be considered 
separately as a rather strange moment for philosophy, a kind of pause in order to test the direction of understanding or of subjective interest in the 
form of desire or morality.  Judgment can do its work of stimulating 
reflective checks on reason because judgment has no a priori principles. It 
responds impartially to stimuli, without measuring the response against pre-
existing models or concepts. 
Literally critical to the faculty of reason, disinterested judgment is 
hard to locate either in the aprioristic workings of pure reason or in the 
desire and morality within practical reason, where embodied needs and 
obligations similarly depend on a priori principles. Where, then, is 
independent judgment to be found and cultivated?  Kant’s answer famously 
lay in aesthetics. Without frequent exercise in deciding whether our 
enjoyment of beauty is free of appetite and expectation, the faculty of 
judgment remains contaminated by the very drives it should hold in check. 
Schiller would take this philosophical observation to its pedagogical 
consequence rather than just assume, as Kant did, that people naturally 
develop an aesthetic sense of life.
Kant’s judgment of disinterested pleasure produces yet another 
innovation in philosophy, on Arendt’s reading: It links one subjectivity to 
others. “Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others 
are open to inspection.  Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary 
business, does not cut itself off from ‘all others.’ To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the force of imagination it makes the others present and 
thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides.”10 And 
since one imagines others moved by the same disinterested pleasure, an 
inter-subjective delight can become the “common sense” of beauty. Kant 
found it remarkable “how little difference there is between the learned and 
the ignorant in judging, while there is the greatest difference in making.”11 
Though Schiller would rejoin that “making” is as general an activity as 
judging, Arendt celebrates Kant’s already significant stretch of philosophy, 
from one subject’s isolated relationship to truth or morality toward 
imagining another subject’s response to beauty. Here for the first time, she 
says, philosophy makes a lateral move from one subject to another, unlike 
standard vertical steps between a subject and the True or the Good. She 
identifies this common sense of beauty as the foundation for other 
interpersonal interchanges grounded in disinterested freedom. The freely 
intuited inter-subjectivity of aesthetic judgment builds a two-lane bridge: It 
harmonizes our otherwise disjointed faculties of cognition and desire; and it 
links one subject to others. 
Even before Schiller recoiled at the relentless Formtrieb that drove the 
French Revolution to barbaric excess, Kant had worried about the arrogance 
of pure reason, “the officious pretensions of understanding.” 12 In response, 
he demonstrated not only that understanding is restrained by ideas that have no a priori grounding in nature, but also that, in order to complete its own 
task of cognition, understanding needs to exercise judgment,13 a faculty that 
depends on free and disinterested contemplation. Kant followed the 
consequences of disinterested pleasure with quiet dignity to ground a 
peaceful coexistence between knowing and feeling in the dependence of 
each on the judgment that we hone through aesthetic appreciation.  Arendt 
adds – with an innocent mischief that Schiller would have recognized as 
play -- that Kant never really wrote a political philosophy: the title of her 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy is a joke, both because he was too 
cautious to risk political attention and because a politics would have been 
redundant after his aesthetics.14 The judgment of beauty that locates a 
commonality in freedom has done the work already. I suspect that Arendt 
also had Schiller’s bold manifesto in mind, and that his strong case for 
saving reason through feelings made the master’s mildness vibrate for her 
with political purpose.15 Here is Schiller:
Reason has done all that she could in finding the law and 
promulgating it; it is for the energy of the will and the ardour of 
feeling to carry it out. To issue victoriously from her contest 
with force, truth herself must first become a force, and turn one 
of the instincts of man into her champion in the empire of 
phaenomena. For instincts are the only motive forces in the material world. If hitherto truth has so little manifested her 
victorious power, this has not depended on the understanding, 
which could not have unveiled it, but on the heart which 
remained closed to it, and on instinct which did not act with it. 
[Letter viii]
Schiller’s daring and energy raise the din of the dueling drives to a 
pitch that demands more active intervention than a contemplative pause will 
allow. Kant had favored spectatorship over action, impartiality over taking 
part in history. “The importance of the occurrence is for him exclusively in 
the eye of the beholder,” Arendt stresses, “in the opinion of the onlookers 
who proclaim their attitude in public. . .  The spectator is impartial by 
definition – no part is assigned him. Hence, withdrawal from direct 
involvement to a standpoint outside the game is a condition sine qua non of 
all judgment.”16  But Schiller looked on as history swept practically 
everyone into action. Not to pursue freedom actively through art would be 
complicity with disaster. “Now man can be opposed to himself in a twofold 
manner: either as a savage, when his feelings rule over his principles; or as a 
barbarian, when his principles destroy his feelings. The savage despises art, 
and acknowledges nature as his despotic ruler; the barbarian laughs at 
nature, and dishonors it, but he often proceeds in a more contemptible way 
than the savage, to be the slave of his senses” [Letter iv]. When Walter Benjamin remarked that the history of civilization was also the history of 
barbarism he was evidently glossing Schiller’s condemnation of reason run 
wild.17 Compared to Kant’s warning against the self-defeating “officious 
pretensions” of understanding, Schiller’s objection sounds almost shrill: 
Have I gone too far in this portraiture of our times? I do not 
anticipate this stricture, but rather another - that I have proved too 
much by it. You will tell me that the picture I have presented 
resembles the humanity of our day, but it also bodies forth all nations 
engaged in the same degree of culture, because all, without exception, 
have fallen off from nature by the abuse of reason, before they can 
return to it through reason” [Letter vi, my emphasis].” 
The return depends on working with passion. Starting in step with Kant, 
Schiller shows the short circuit of a single-minded drive.  But instead of 
checking reason with disinterested judgment, Schiller dispatches a Reason 
worthy of its name on a self-correcting detour through the passions. “Reason 
is obliged to make this demand, because her nature impels her to 
completeness and to the removal of all bounds; while every exclusive 
activity of one or the other impulse leaves human nature incomplete and 
places a limit in it” [Letter xv].Schiller’s point of departure from Kant comes after the step they both take 
backward to disengage from contending instincts.  Where Kant had stopped 
at the hiatus for disinterested reflection, Schiller gets a fresh start towards 
producing new forms. Schiller wonders how reliable judgment per se can be 
when passions run high and inflame whole populations or else singe them 
into passivity with the dread of smoldering ruins. Difficult times need outlets 
for the energy that would otherwise fight or fester; they need ever new 
interventions to wrest pleasing forms out of decaying matter. Schiller, the 
artist and maker of new things, girds for action to quell the raging drives of 
the Formtrieb against the Sinnestrieb. Where the master had left the 
judgment of beauty as the last word, the disciple smuggles into his missive 
the act of making art.
PLAY’S THE THING
Some act of disruption was called for to break the vicious circle of 
demands and disasters. The circle locked out freedom from a state that 
depends on its citizens to exercise freedom, but that citizens in turn depend 
on to structure the exercise by means of education. Kant simply syncopated 
the rhythm of history with halts for judgment of the world as it is, counting 
on an innate faculty even while he admitted it needs training; but Schiller’s 
bold intervention was to offer that training, educate citizens as active artists 
who imagine not only what is, but what could be. His step back from the conflicting drives activates a motor for making art: a third humanizing 
instinct, the Spieltrieb or “Playdrive.” Play builds a dynamic bridge called 
art in order to brace the conflict between flesh and spirit. As a remedy for 
reason’s abuses of nature and for nature’s indifference toward reason, the 
Playdrive takes a risk on the uncharted practice of creative art. The 
postulation of this third drive is Schiller’s most original departure from 
Kant: the freedom that beauty makes available at the moment of judgment 
discloses a new horizon stimulating the observer to make more art and 
thereby to expand the experience of freedom. “Soon it will not be sufficient 
for things to please him; he will wish to please” [Letter xxvii]. Creative play 
links individuals with the collective by leaving traces of particularity in the 
artwork, while the work also accesses a general freedom to produce 
responses, variations, new experiments. “Independently of the use to which 
it is destined, the object ought also to reflect the enlightened intelligence 
which imagines it, the hand which shaped it with affection, the mind free 
and serene which chose it and exposed it to view” [Letter xxvii].  When an 
artistic experiment succeeds, it invites or distracts even an unenlightened 
public to recognize the man-made miracle of timeless form in material 
incarnation. 
For Schiller, the tortuous process of making art dissolves the 
contradiction between time and timelessness, even for skeptics who can be moved by beauty when they would not be budged by argument. The promise 
of reconciliation through irresistible pleasure inspires this unabashed 
sermon: 
Direct the world on which you act towards that which is 
good, and the measured and peaceful course of time will bring 
about the results. You have given it this direction if by your 
teaching you raise its thoughts towards the necessary and the 
eternal; . . Cherish triumphant truth in the modest sanctuary of 
your heart; give it an incarnate form through beauty, that it may 
not only be the understanding that does homage to it, but that 
feeling may lovingly grasp its appearance . . . Live with your 
age, but be not its creation; labour for your contemporaries, but 
do for them what they need, and not what they praise. Without 
having shared their faults, share their punishment with a noble 
resignation, and bend under the yoke which they find is as 
painful to dispense with as to bear. . .  The gravity of your 
principles will keep them off from you, but in play they will 
still endure them. Their taste is purer than their heart, and it is 
by their taste you must lay hold of this suspicious fugitive. In 
vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn 
their actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. Drive away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their 
pleasures, and you will banish them imperceptibly from their 
acts, and length from their feelings. Everywhere that you meet 
them, surround them with great, noble, and ingenious forms; 
multiply around them the symbols of perfection, till appearance 
triumphs over reality, and art over nature. [end of Letter ix]
This is no romantic brief promoting feeling over reason, no advice to aim for 
the heart instead of the head in order to win people to the truth. Instead 
Schiller holds out for enlightened dispassionate taste as a common sense of 
value. “Their taste is purer than their heart.” Cultivate that taste with real 
beauty, he adds in a Kantian spirit, and common sense will overtake 
pettiness. But cultivation cannot prosper under the weight of Kant’s grave 
and off-putting principles. So Schiller incites us to play and to enchant even 
unwilling subjects with more art than they can resist; that way reluctant 
spirits can find freedom and not block the way with their inertia. Reason is 
quite helpless here, since arguments excite counter-arguments but not the 
will to change. It was just this tendency, where counter-arguments set off a 
spiral of reason and resistance, that led Foucault, among others, to become 
skeptical about the possibility of real change, as if reason were the only 
faculty that mattered. Schiller did not despair.  Nor would John Dewey, Herbert Marcuse,18 
Paolo Freire, Antonio Gramsci,19 Augusto Boal,20 Antanas Mockus, Jacques 
Rancière.  These and other exemplary agents of change investigate the 
spirals of power and passion to locate notches or weak points that may admit 
interference. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), Freire called these points 
“limit situations” that can provoke innovative limit actions, interventions 
that go beyond currently legitimate procedure.21  Mockus, the former mayor 
of Bogotá, Colombia, would call the openings ambiguous or unfinished 
moments of a narrative.22  By a deceptively simple replacement of the 
preposition for, Freire short-circuited the closed system of inversions that 
follows from Hegel’s dialectic between masters, who become dependent on 
their slaves, and slaves, who master productive processes. The circle opens 
by interrupting the top-down and bottom-up dynamic with two-way 
dialogue. Rather than work for the oppressed, in the vanguard manner of 
Lukacs and other Marxists who take the lead and thereby recreate the 
asymmetries they had rejected as bourgeois, Freire exhorts us to work 
shoulder to shoulder with the oppressed on creative projects that interrupt 
systematic unfairness.23 The problem has been, he says, that when the 
oppressed get some power, they tend to become oppressors instead of 
building solidarity.  Freire’s solution is to play new games. Instead of 
vertical follow-the-leader, he invites us to play team sports that respect the initiative of each player in horizontal relationships that can add up to 
democracy. Liberty lives in the form of these lateral labor relations for 
Freire. Curiously, the shape of this Marxist reformer’s improved society 
looks a lot like liberal inter-subjectivity among equals. 
Freire’s appreciation for ingenuity in everyone doesn’t exactly depend 
on art, if you take his word for it. But his instructions for upsetting an 
oppressive status quo by way of cultural interventions bring him into an 
inevitable conversation with artists and indirectly with Schiller, because 
successful interventions must be artful.24 For Freire a systemic view of 
education would be paralyzing, since change would seem impossible 
without the kind of liberating education that existing systems inhibit.  The 
only effective approach to change is to create projects that force wedges of 
alternative education into systemic stratification and thereby disrupt 
oppressive stasis with dynamic models of equality. Freire may not call the 
disruptive innovations art, but the risk-taking collaborative experiments he 
advocated probably merit the name, even if they are not “purposeless” in the 
disinterested way that identifies art for Kant and his disciples.25 Schiller 
might have hesitated to confer the honorific title of artist on Freire, because 
didactic content-driven art was a contradiction in terms. Art doesn’t preach; 
it demands freedom of the maker and delivers it to the public. [Letter xxii] But Freire is too powerful a partisan of educational reform for us to 
yield him up to a purist objection without lodging a counter-argument on his 
behalf.  The instance of Schiller lets us see that Freire’s pedagogy of the 
oppressed is a notably formal novelty, practically indifferent to the substance 
of lessons but alive to their relational grammar. Freire plays with 
conventional hierarchies of teacher and student, leader and follower, to 
scramble the order and level the players into risky horizontal relationships 
where a teacher’s expertise can be humbled by a student’s experience. I 
recognize the points of contact between this pedagogy and Schiller’s 
aesthetic education, in order to underline their common grounding in 
dynamic exchanges between ideas and material reality.  Like Schiller’s own 
Letters, Freire’s book is a purposeful intervention that exhorts us to be 
creative, though Schiller would keep our creations free of immediate 
purpose so that works of art may train the soul toward freedom. 
Freire may be drawing from Schiller’s legacy only indirectly. But an 
earlier twentieth-century  educational reformer enlisted Schiller explicitly in 
a provocative defense of the artist in everyman as the cornerstone of 
democracy. I mean the philosopher John Dewey. His encomium to art as a 
fundamental human experience sounds practically paraphrased from the 
Aesthetic Education: “The existence of art is the concrete proof . . . that man 
uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life, and that he does so in accord with the structure of his organism – brain, 
sense-organs, and muscular system. Art is the living and concrete proof that 
man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, 
the union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live 
creature.”26   A fan of Schiller, who thought about art “independently of the 
use to which it is destined [Letter xxvii],”  and a rather harsh critic of Kant’s 
exemption of beauty from any practical purpose, Dewey considered art to be 
anything done with care, intensity, and satisfaction:27 “the tense grace of the 
ball-player infects the onlooking crowd . . . the delight of the housewife in 
tending her plants. . . What Coleridge said of the reader of poetry is true in 
its way of all who are happily absorbed in their activities of mind and 
body.”28  This democratizing adjustment of registers specifically rejects 
specious distinctions between intellectuals and artists, bringing philosopher 
Dewey even closer to artist Schiller: 
The difference between the esthetic and the intellectual is 
thus one of the places where emphasis falls in the constant 
rhythm that marks the interactions of the live creature with his 
surroundings.  The ultimate matter of both emphases in 
experience is the same, as is also their general form.  The odd 
notion that an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else is the result of converting a difference of tempo 
and emphasis into a difference in kind.29 
Dewey didn’t privilege one form over another. Instead he stayed close to 
Schiller by celebrating the intensity of serious play that took many and new 
forms. 
“Form is experienced for itself” is Jacques Rancière’s short-hand for 
Schiller’s founding and “unsurpassable” manifesto for the “aesthetic 
regime” of art. Rancière defines this regime in contrast both to the “ethical 
regime of images,” which cares more about content than about form, and to 
the “poetic or representative regime of arts,” which privileges particular 
rules of genre and ways of making. For Rancière as for Schiller, art sets 
itself free in instances of pure suspension that are nevertheless 
indistinguishable from moments of daily life. “The aesthetic regime asserts 
the absolute singularity of art and, at the same time, destroys any pragmatic 
criterion for isolating this singularity. It simultaneously establishes the 
autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses to 
shape itself.”30 Remarkably aligned with Dewey’s appreciation for Schiller’s 
everyman artist, Rancière never mentions the American philosopher, and he 
holds back from openly advocating the approach that looked so liberating 
before World War II in Dewey’s 1932 essays.  [Rancière doesn’t mention 
Freire either, even though his Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987) would have found good company in the widely circulated Pedagogy of the Oppressed.] 
Though Schiller’s aesthetic revolution “produced a new idea of political 
revolution” as the realization of a common and creative humanity, and 
though this became the core of German Romanticism “summarized in the 
rough draft of a program written together by Hegel, Hölderlin, and 
Schelling,” the political movement failed and tainted the aesthetic model 
with failure too: “Modernity thus became something like a fatal destiny 
based on a fundamental forgetting.”31 Rancière doesn’t simply decry the 
loss; he also jogs our cultural memory to rediscover Schiller and company. It 
is too soon to declare defeat, he chides his relatively privileged colleagues, 
for an aesthetic regime that can still multiply and redistribute instances of art 
in egalitarian relation to life. It is also irresponsibly convenient, Ranciere 
adds, for intellectuals to complain about collective losses while they while 
they do little to recover resources and instead live comfortably above the 
rubble. 
  The accusation of bad faith among dour critics recalls Schiller’s 
objection to the willful and humorlessness dismissal of play. Playfulness 
would interrupt the complacency of despair that remains stuck in unhappy 
history. Because play short-circuits the spiraling antagonism between flesh 
and spirit, and side-steps existing arrangements in the name of imagination 
and freedom, it is the surest way to achieve lasting social progress, Schiller affirms in one letter after another. In any case, practically all other 
approaches to change build in their own self-defeating dynamic of resistance 
and rejection. Without pleasure there is no enduring progress, I am learning, 
because imposed change generates resentment and rebellion. Schiller 
underscored this  lesson for me when I re-read his Letters, especially the 
homily quoted above that urges us to charm the enemy when we cannot 
convince him.  But the message came to me first from a contemporary 
master of play, Antanas Mockus, philosopher and former mayor of Bogotá. 
ICE BREAKERS
First elected in 1995, Mockus took office when the city seemed 
beyond help. For more than a decade, general chaos had kept the capital off 
limits for tourists and had tormented residents. Given a level of corruption 
that turned investment against itself, the situation appeared hopeless. More 
money for economic recovery would deepen the pockets of drug dealers, and 
more armed police would escalate the number of guns and therefore the 
level of violence. What intervention could possibly make sense in this 
festering and volatile situation? When I ask this question of economists and 
political scientists, they think hard but then admit they are stumped. When I 
ask it of artists, they usually stall for more time, awaiting an inspiration  
from somewhere outside the box of familiar tools. As for Mockus, intellectually he understood his administration in social-scientific, rational, 
procedural terms designed to generate shared norms and to build consensus, 
along lines so centrally derived from Jürgen Habermas that some students 
affectionately called the mayor Professor Habermockus.  But in practice, 
Mockus achieved consensus and civility by spiking communicative action 
with the kind of unconventional creativity we call play or art. 
To revive a democratizing desire for civility, Mayor Mockus 
combined art and antics with accountability. As if Schiller were coaching 
him, the mayor turned to play in his efforts to reunite the body and soul of 
the city.32 He broke the ice by replacing the corrupt traffic police with 
pantomime artists who multiplied their numbers by training new recruits 
from among the artists on the street. The unavoidable spectacle created a 
public of participant pedestrians and drivers who began to enjoy 
communication with strangers for the first time in over a decade and to 
revive  a common sense of citizenship that dared to overcome fear and 
isolation. Pragmatism depends on a measure of hedonism, as well as on 
tough law enforcement and fiscal transparency: in philosophical summary, 
that combination was the general program this visionary mayor called “civic 
culture.” The city that plays together stays alive to civic rights and 
obligations. In a recent interview, Mockus commented on several Latin 
American mayors who were eager to learn from his experience.33 The mayor of Asunción, Paraguay was searching for new leads after thorough statistical 
analyses of the city’s problems had failed to spark projects for amelioration, 
while the mayors of Mexico City and Belo Horizonte were willing to try 
playful interventions.  Buenos Aires being risk-averse under its current 
mayor, Mockus concluded there was hardly anything creative to be done 
there.
Play assumes risks through uncharted moves that depend on freedom 
and therefore demand it, moves that anticipate failures as cues for 
abandoning some experiments and constructing new ones. Play also admits 
to living in the shadow-life of mere appearances, to being blatantly 
counterfactual. When critics accuse Mockus of thinking counterfactually, he 
agrees with them, but adds with almost impish self-evidence that it is 
impossible to think of change without appealing to counterfactual flights of 
imagination. The equivalent term in Schiller for counterfactual thinking is 
“appearance” [Schein], and he defends it at length against both “extreme 
stupidity and extreme intelligence.” The one has no imagination, and the 
other refuses anything but ideal truth. They cannot or will not think outside 
the box of reality and consequently forfeit the freedom that appearance can 
exercise.  
DELIBERATIVE DIFFERENCES.Under-determined and available for imaginative explorations, 
appearance is precisely the feature that draws Habermas to Schiller’s Letters 
as an antidote to both the willfully naïve tendentiousness of Surrealism and 
the withering intelligence of Deconstruction. In the 1920s and 30s, 
Surrealism had imagined that art worthy of its unconventional nature could 
dissolve the tensions built into modern life by plumbing a deep and irrational 
level of consciousness that dreamt away the distance between art and life.34 
By the 1970s, Deconstruction revived this oneiric campaign against 
reasonable distinctions in a more philosophical register: If meaning is 
constructed from words and words are artificial abstractions that over-shoot 
or under-estimate the things or actions they signify, then words betray us; 
they mislead intentions and undermine communication.35 Presumptively real 
information unravels under this rigorous scrutiny and leads practically 
nowhere. Both Surrealists and Deconstructionists exposed the fragile 
distinctions between data and desire, hoping finally to unhinge the gate, 
already worn down from centuries of skepticism about reasonable 
communication, that separated art from life and rhetoric from literal 
meaning. 
But for Habermas the hinge is worth repairing, as he takes an 
Excursus on Schiller to get from one lecture on Hegel to another in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). By marking off fact from fiction, the gate of consciousness safeguards a realm for imagination. It 
marks a border crossing from the land of material and ideological conflicts -- 
that run people aground -- into the fresh air of counterfactual “appearances,” 
which Schiller defended as the imaginary dimension that attests to human 
faculties for free speculation. Alongside the factual world of competition for 
limited resources and between conflicting ideas, there is a creative 
disinterested region for the inter-subjective communication that Schiller 
calls art and that Habermas claims as his own baseline for constructing 
collective agreements: 
If art is to be able to fulfill its historic task of reconciling 
a modernity at variance with itself, it must not merely impinge 
on individuals, but rather transform the forms of life that 
individuals share.  Hence, Schiller stresses the community-
building, solidarity-giving force of art; its public character. The 
point of his analysis of the present is that in the modern 
conditions of life, particular forces could be differentiated and 
developed only at the cost of the fragmentation of the totality.36 
“Totality of character [of a society] must therefore be found in a 
people that is capable and worthy of exchanging the State of need for 
the State of freedom” [Schiller, Letter iv]. And freedom issues from 
the joyous play of appearance, which is why Habermas defends play against Surrealist blurring of the border between art and life and also 
against Nietzschean deconstruction of their difference. These facile 
egalitarianisms whose outcomes are predictable collapse the 
imagination’s room and stymie  the dynamism that democracy 
depends on. 
As a response to the often violent opposition between reason and 
desire that Habermas locates at the heart of modernity, art’s sidestep from 
factual reality isn’t exactly the solution that we would expect from the 
theorist of communicative action – unless, that is, we take him at his word 
about Schiller and allow that art should be understood as free 
communication that builds community.  And in fact the genealogy of ideas 
we traced above between Kant and Schiller gives us good warrant to do so.  
It was Schiller’s friendly amendment to Kant’s Third Critique that taught 
Habermas to pick his way through modernity’s deadlock between 
impersonal pure reason and embodied subjective practical reason.  The 
Kantian bridge of aesthetic judgment, as expanded by Schiller into a 
dynamic process of autonomous creativity, underwrites Habermas’ long 
sessions of communicative action. Schiller’s unpretentious process made 
good, Habermas saw, on Kant’s enlightened project to promote disinterested 
communication:Kant’s Critique of Judgment also provided an entry for 
speculative Idealism that could not rest content with the 
Kantian differentiations between understanding and sense, 
freedom and necessity, mind and nature, because it perceived in 
precisely these distinctions the expression of dichotomies 
inherent in modern life-conditions. But the mediating power of 
reflective judgment served Schelling and Hegel as the bridge to 
an intellectual intuition that was to assure itself of absolute 
identity. Schiller was more modest. He held on to the restricted 
significance of aesthetic judgment in order to make use of it for 
a philosophy of history. He thereby tacitly mixed the Kantian 
with the traditional concept of judgment, which in the 
Aristotelian tradition (down to Hannah Arendt) never 
completely lost its connection with the political concept of 
common sense. So he could conceive of art as primarily a form 
of communication and assign to it the task of bringing about 
‘harmony in society’: ‘All other forms of communication divide 
society, because they relate exclusively either to the private 
sensibility or to the private skillfulness of its individual 
members, that is, to what distinguishes between one man and 
another; only the communication of the Beautiful unites society, because it relates to what is common to them all’ [Letter 
xxvii].37 
I offer this fundamental connection between aesthetic education and 
discourse ethics as a tribute to Mayor Mockus and other daring public 
figures who may feel disinclined to call their work art and yet strive to adapt 
Habermas’s communicative action in the service of local democracy.  When 
I interviewed Mockus, he politely resisted my insistent line of questioning 
about the artistic cast of his administration, probably because the art label 
would somehow diminish, for some citizens, the seriousness of his efforts 
and accomplishments.  All the same, convinced as he is that communicative 
action or discourse ethics is the principle of his politics, Mockus does admit 
to thinking like an artist – without theorizing why– when nothing else works. 
“When I feel trapped,” he explains, “I ask myself, ‘What would an artist 
do?’”38 Perhaps there is less contradiction between communicative action 
and free play of the imagination than he or I had assumed, and fewer 
“unbridgeable gaps” than the inflexible categorical imperatives would locate 
as obstacles to negotiation.
DISMISSIVE de MAN
Schiller had surely encountered inflexibility, to judge from his 
irritation with the extreme stupidity and the extreme intelligence that would have no truck with the mere appearance that freedom depends on.  The 
exasperated tone of his defense predicts posthumous trouble from future 
readers. Paul de Man, for one, in an unfriendly reading of the Aesthetic 
Education would taunt Schiller for discrediting Kant as too stupid, and  
Hegel as too smart, to perceive Schiller’s kind of beauty.39 Protecting Kant 
and Hegel against Schiller in this way commits de Man to a willfully narrow 
reading of their respective projects. During the heyday of Deconstruction de 
Man dismisses Schiller for the same reasons that prompt Habermas to revive 
him as a stay against it.  Schiller knew that life and art can bleed into one 
another, but he held out for the autonomy of art in order to cultivate the 
imagination and freedom, while de Man had founded his own career on 
denying this autonomy of art, along with his own complicity with Nazi 
propaganda that confused fact with paranoid fantasy. 
De Man meant to diminish the seriousness of Schiller’s 
accomplishments by limiting the legitimate uses of the word Schein to those 
anchored in existing phenomena, as evidence of the real world and therefore 
appropriate for philosophy. But the evident liberty that Schiller took with 
appearance was to free it from contemporary philosophy’s apologetic 
references to the real thing and to follow the erratic tangents of appearance 
into fictions beyond phenomenological perception. To dismiss imagination 
from the play of appearances, and thereby to reduce the work of philosophy to a decision between correct and incorrect representations of the real world, 
betrays a misguided simplicity of thought like the one J. L. Austin 
denounced among philosophers who assumed that the only use of words is 
to make true or false statements.40 Contra Schiller, de Man discredits the 
imagination’s unfettered exercise through counterfactual appearance and 
adds a rather misogynist corollary argument as if to clinch his case: the 
preference for art with its mass appeal over elite philosophy amounts to a 
feminine preference for form over a masculine respect for content.41  Hostile 
or grumpy, by dismissing women and Schiller in the same stroke because 
they allegedly favor frivolity and offend rigor, de Man also discounts the 
contrast Arendt draws between Hegel’s elitism and Kant’s frustrated 
ambition to popularize philosophy. By keeping “common sense” in common 
discourse but resignifying it as collective and disinterested judgment in all 
subjects, Kant inverted the order of importance from the few who enact 
history to the many who observe it, coming much closer to Schiller’s mass 
appeal than de Man admits. 
Reality is given and constrains us, but appearance in Schiller’s 
enabling use of the word is a man-made effect. Appearance embodies the 
liberating and ludic pleasure of making something new. Schiller is careful to 
distinguish between appearance and deception; the one distances us from 
reality and so enables a critical perspective in order to intervene in it, and the other interferes in the real world surreptitiously. The distinction is meant to 
pre-empt a categorical dismissal of all the games of appearance, though 
some skeptics won’t stop at useful boundaries, as Habermas complains and 
as de Man demonstrates. Excessive caution banishes “all the fine arts of 
which appearance is the essence.”  Such dehumanizing zeal for reality 
tragically sacrifices freedom when it ostracizes beauty “because it is only an 
appearance” [Letter xxvi]. Today a grim seriousness refuses the broad-based 
seductions of art and eliminates the arts from public education, even while 
the business of art booms. Privileged producers play to curators and 
collectors, and these advantaged consumers value artworks as measures of 
their own elite taste and power of acquisition. But the fundamental 
playdrive, the actively creative faculty in all of us that Schiller was sure 
amounted to our talent for being human, has been relegated and reduced to 
dangerously narrow dimensions.42  
READY?
Schiller’s Letters can gird the reader with sound arguments against 
zealots and skeptics alike.  The book is not so much a training manual for 
young artists as a coaching aid to help them keep up the effort in face of 
discouragement. Kant may have imagined that his arguments depended only 
on clarity of thought and expression rather than on sentimental persuasion, 
though the redundancy and insistence of several arguments hint at some nervousness as to how they will be received.-. But Schiller is both frank and 
eloquent about his challenge to charm and to win skeptics over to art, so firm 
is his faith in humanity’s deep sensitivity to beauty even when reason fails. 
The letters are seductive if persistent, and by the last one only philistines 
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